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Abstract: The phenomenal economic growth in China has been accompanied by a rapid 
increase in income inequality. This paper reviews the historical trends and patterns of income 
inequality in China, discusses the potential causes underlying rising income inequality, and 
applies the functional distribution of income approach in understanding China’s income 
inequality. This analytical approach highlights how rising return to capital relative to wage 
incomes can be an important source for increasing income inequality in China. The paper 
provides the evidence which shows that the rapid economic growth in China has been relying 
on a model that pays high returns to various kinds of capital including financial capital and 
real estate, while the ownership of capital is very unequal. This finding prompts us to rethink 
about the causes of China’s income inequality and to formulate appropriate policies based on 
the new way of understanding this pressing issue of income distribution in China.  
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INTRODUCTION 
China has been one of the fastest growing economies in the world since the introduction of its 
reform policies in the late 1970s. Its per capita GDP has grown at an average rate of around 9 
percent for almost three decades. However, this phenomenal economic growth has been 
accompanied by a rapid increase in income inequality. Although estimates of Gini 
coefficients vary substantially with respect to sources of data, geographic coverage of surveys 
and length of time periods, a general consensus from the existing studies is that China’s 
income inequality has risen markedly since 1978 (as shown in Annex Table A1). As shown in 
Figure 1, according to one source, China’s Gini coefficient increased from about 0.310 in 
1981 to 0.491 in 2008 before declining marginally to 0.474 in 20123. According to the China 
Household and Income Project (CHIP), in 1988 the share of income of Chinese households in 
the highest ten percent, ranked by household income, was 7.3 times the share of income of 
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 households in the lowest 10 percent. This ratio rose to 19 in 2002, indicating a much larger 
income gap between the richest and the poorest over this period.  
The rapid increase in income inequality has put China among the most unequal countries in 
Asia and indeed the world. China is now one of the least equal 25 percent of countries 
worldwide, a group to which very few Asian countries belong (Sicular, 2014) (Annex Tables 
2 and 3). With a Gini coefficient approaching 0.5, China’s level of income inequality is 
similar to that of several high-inequality Latin American countries (Sicular 2013) (Figure 2). 
This shows that income inequality does become an economic, political and social problem for 
China. The purposes of this paper are therefore to try to identify the fundamental causes for 
the rising income inequality in China in the process of economic transition through reviews 
of the key literature, and discuss some policy implications for confronting the challenge of 
narrowing income inequality for achieving more sustainable growth and social stability in 
China.  
Figure 1: Income Inequality in China, 1981-2013 
 
Source: Gini coefficients for the years 1981–2001 are from Ravallion and Chen (2007), 2002 from WIID, 2003–
2012 from the National Bureau of Statistics. Please refer to Annex Table A1 for data. 
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Figure 2: Ranking of countries by Gini coefficient, 2014 
 
Source: CIA World Factbook accessed in October 2014. 
Note: The coefficients of different countries are calculated for different years. For detailed information, see: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2172rank.html 
 
CAUSES OF RISING INCOME INEQUALITY 
Income inequality rises along with the increase in national income and may fall after a 
country reaches a certain level of income on per capita terms. This pattern of changes in 
inequality in relation to changes in income is commonly referred to as the inverted Kuznets 
U-curve (Kuznets 1955). The Kuznets hypothesis implies that there is a causal relationship 
running from economic or income growth to income inequality. In other words, with the 
prospect of continuingly increasing national income associated with institutional and policy 
changes countries will eventually solve the problem of inequality. However, in reality, 
patterns of income inequality have been persistent for all kinds of countries both developing 
and developed ones. Potential causes for this phenomenon can be much complex involving 
factors such as differences in levels of development, the pattern of structural changes, both 
political and economic institutions, social norms and cultural factors and geography. It is 
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 even more so for China as the country is not only a developing country but also a transition 
economy. A transition economy emphasises economic incentives but lacks of market means 
for allocating resources, and the redistribution function for the government. In addition, there 
are various kinds of loopholes in its institutions in transition which are the causes for the so-
called ‘grey income’ and rampant corruptions (Wang and Woo 2011).       
In this paper, we will discuss income inequality issues in China both by size distribution of 
income and by the functional distribution of income. The formal examines how the income 
shares of particular deciles change and whether Gini coefficients exhibit greater or lesser 
inequality over time; and the latter divides income according to its sources such as labour, 
land and capital, namely the division of national product between wages and profits (Fields, 
1980). Approaching income inequality by applying the functional distribution analysis has 
become more popular after the publication of Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Piketty 
(2014).  
As the data shows later on in this paper, the inequality of income distribution from the 
functional distribution has become one of the most important sources for the rising income 
inequality in China especially between returns to capital and wages.  
A call for more equal distribution of income also raises an important question as to how equal 
the distribution system can be. A related conceptual issue is whether there is a trade-off 
between efficiency and equity. In other words, whether achieving a goal of efficiency will 
lead to rising inequity; or whether dealing with inequality will compromise efficiency which 
in turn will affect governments’ capacity for income redistribution. The formal is obvious 
from the Chinese experience, but the latter is not that straightforward in that there are social 
and ethical considerations involved apart from economic ones. There is much evidence which 
shows that over-emphasising income equality at the expenses of incentives and efficiency 
could compromise growth leading to the phenomenon of ‘the middle income trap’. As Piketty 
quoted Charles Dunoyer (1845) as saying, “Reduce everything to equality and you will bring 
everything to a standstill” (p. 85). Finding a right balance between efficiency and equity is 
one of the most challenging tasks for China’s economic reform and public policy at the 
present.  
We now summarise those main sources of income inequality in China in turn.  
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 The urban-rural income gap 
The income gap between urban and rural households in China is one of the largest in the 
world. The share of the urban-rural income gap in total income inequality increased by 10 
percentage points over the period 1995-2007, rising from 38 percent to 48 percent (Li and 
Zhao, 2011). In other words, by 2007, according to official statistics, almost half of all 
inequality in China was due to the urban-rural income gap.  
Figure 3 shows the growing gap between urban and rural residents as recorded by official 
statistics. In the early 1980s, the urban-rural income gap contracted. In 1978, the Chinese 
government introduced a number of agricultural reform policies, including lifting agricultural 
prices and the replacement of collective farming by the household responsibility system. 
These policies led to the subsequent rapid growth of rural residents’ incomes. Between 1978 
and 1983, the ratio of per capita net income4 of rural households to per capita disposable 
income of urban households was reduced from 2.5 to 1.8, the lowest level over the past four 
decades. Since then the ratio has increased in most years and peaked out to 3.3 in 2006-2009, 
though it has fallen slightly in recent years.  
The high urban-rural income gap naturally translates into differences in the ownership of 
durable goods such as washing machines, fridges and computers, all considered essential 
household goods in developed countries (Annex Table A4). The growing gap between urban 
and rural income is the result of very rapid growth in urban incomes. Between 2002 and 
2007, for example, rural incomes grew at an average annual rate of more than 7 percent, but 
urban incomes grew at 11 percent (in constant prices) (Sicular 2013).  
Industrial productivity is typically much higher than rural productivity because industrial 
sectors are increasing return activities. This explains why urban incomes are above rural in 
many countries. In China, constraints on migration limit the extent to which rural residents 
can move to urban areas in search of higher incomes and thereby reduce or close the urban-
income gap. China’s household registration or hukou system registers every household as 
either rural or urban. There has been limited growth in urban hukou numbers. Households 
without urban hukou face low access to public services such as education and health care and, 
if they migrate, generally take lower-paying jobs. This restricts rural-urban migration. 
4 According to the explanation in China’s statistical yearbooks, net incomes of rural households refers to the 
total income of rural households from all sources minus all corresponding expenses, including household 
operation expenses, agricultural taxes and fees, depreciation of fixed assets for production and gifts to rural 
relatives. It is mainly used as input for reinvestment in production and as consumption expenditure for the year, 
and also used for savings and non-compulsory expenses of various forms. 
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 Despite the progress of urbanization which saw urbanization ratio, defined as the ratio of 
urban population to the total population, rose from about 20 percent in the late 1970s to 54 
per cent in 2015, various kinds of institutional and social barriers have still hampered the 
process of migration from rural to urban areas. Overcoming these barriers through 
institutional reform will ripe further gains in productivities for both rural and urban areas 
because of the ‘resource shift effects’ which are the impact of shifting resources from low 
productivity area to high productivity area.  
Figure 3: China’s Urban-Rural Income Ratio, 1985-2013 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics China.  
Note: The urban-rural income ratio is calculated as the ratio between urban per capita disposable income and 
rural per capita net income.  
 
The special arrangements governing Chinese land may also act as a constraint on migration. 
In China, farm households only have land-use rights, not the right to sell their land. Farmers, 
if they decide to permanently leave agriculture, must give up their land to local authorities 
(Yang, 1999). This increases the costs for farmers migrating to cities. Importantly, the slow 
progress in marketizing rural land including both arable land and rural residential land has 
left farmers with very thin asset base, which is in a sharp contrast to urban land which 
witnessed tremendous increases in values in reform period. This point will be echoed when 
we discuss later in the paper the functional distribution of income by which increases in 
return to capital are much higher than those for wages.  
Despite these barriers, migration from rural to urban areas is extensive. The stock of rural-
urban migrants increased rapidly from less than five million in 1978 to more than 250 million 
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 now, accounting for 15 percent of the total population. Most of these migrants are still 
registered as rural households (because they are registered as such), even though they live in 
urban areas. As argued by Xue and Gao (2012), this means that China’s urban-rural income 
gap, calculated using the official statistics, is overestimated. The official household surveys 
are based on urban and rural residence registration (hukou), and so exclude most rural-urban 
migrants (Knight, 2013). Hence, incomes of rural migrants are included in neither the official 
rural nor urban household surveys (except to the extent that their remittances are reported by 
the receiving rural household). This distorts the measurement of the urban-rural income gap. 
The study by Xue and Gao (2012) takes the provinces of Zhejiang and Shaanxi as examples 
and estimates that the urban-rural income gap is overestimated by 41 percent.  
Even if the urban-rural income gap is overestimated, and whether or not it has been 
increasing, it would seem to be high by international standards. In any case, it is at best one 
part of the story of increasing inequality in China. Both rural and urban inequality show an 
upward trend since 1978 (Xue, 2012). Other factors that might explain these increases are 
examined in the sections below. 
Inequality and economic reform 
From one perspective, it is hardly surprising that income inequality has grown in China. As 
reforms introduced since 1979 shifted China from a centrally planned system towards a 
market economy, a series of changes inevitably caused income inequality to rise. Wages 
started to better reflect the market demand for labor and value of education and skills. As 
opportunities arose, more enterprising or simply luckier individuals became entrepreneurs 
and made huge earnings as the economy was liberalized.  
An example of the impact of reform on inequality is that the rural Gini coefficient increased 
from below 0.25 in the 1980s to above 0.30 in the mid-1990s. Rising rural inequality during 
this period was associated with the uneven development of rural township and village 
enterprises (TVEs) across regions and provinces, which itself was a result of the green light 
being given to the creation and growth of such enterprises in the 1980s.  
Urban inequality has likely also been affected by economic reforms. A state-sector 
restructuring program was launched after the Chinese Communist Party’s Congress in 1997 
to shut down loss-making state-owned enterprises (SOEs), corporatize large state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), restructure small SOEs, and de-link the provision of social services from 
SOEs. The 1977 Congress also recognized private enterprises as an important component of 
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 the economy. Consequently, the urban labor market has experienced unprecedented growth in 
unemployment (40 million workers from the state-owned sector were laid off between 1996 
and 2002) and reallocation of labor from the state sector to the private sector.  
Economic reform in China is still incomplete and, as in any economy, some sectors are more 
competitive than others. One finding from the literature is that wage income in monopolistic 
industries is higher than in competitive industries in China. Yue, Li and Sicular (2011) divide 
sectors into those that are monopolistic (e.g. electricity) and those that are competitive (e.g. 
textiles). They find that this division accounts for 8.2 percent of the total income gap among 
workers, and that only differences in education are a more important source of inequality.   
Education  
China’s human capital has experienced remarkable growth over the period of reform. The 
illiteracy rate of the Chinese population fell from 33.6 percent in 1982 to 4.9 percent in 
20135. The number of regular senior secondary school graduates increased from 6.83 million 
to 7.99 million over 1978-2013, while the number of regular undergraduate and college 
graduates rose from 0.17 million to 6.25 million (NBS, 2014; UNESCO, 2013; Wei and Hao, 
2011). Education plays an increasingly important role in determining income distribution, 
with widening income gaps between individuals with different educational backgrounds due 
to skill-biased technological change and China’s deeper engagement in global markets. 
According to Li and Zhao (2011), the returns to education have been increasing. Compared to 
those with lower levels of education (junior high school and below), graduates from senior 
high school, technical school and college earned 4 percent, 7 percent, and 14 percent more 
respectively in 1998. By 2009, these premia increased to 18 percent, 32 percent, and 61 
percent, respectively (Meng et al., 2013).  
An interesting perspective is to examine the extent to which wage premia are growing due to 
increasing returns to skills or, in fact, discrimination. Knight and Song (2007) found that the 
increase in wage premia was partly due to new and growing forms of discrimination. Knight 
and Yueh (2008) identified the ongoing importance of social connections in wage 
determination, despite strengthening of market forces. For example, rural-urban migrants 
lacking urban hukou could be treated as second-class citizens in cities and placed on an 
unequal footing in the job market. (Annex Table A5 presents the wage disparity between 
5 The illiteracy rate in 1982 is reported by The Central People’s Government of People’s Republic of China at 
http://www.gov.cn/test/2011-10/31/content_29930.htm. 
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 migrant workers and urban workers.) These migrants are less qualified, but Knight and Yueh 
(2008) argue that the difference in their expected wages is due not only to differences in 
qualifications, but also differences in connectedness. 
There is a great disparity in the quantity and quality of education that urban and rural children 
receive. There is also a gap in the educational attainment of the children of migrant workers 
and the children of urban residents (Golley and Kong, 2013). The transmission of education 
from one generation of a household to another is a powerful phenomenon in reform-era China 
and has become stronger in recent years. It tends to reproduce educational inequality, and 
thus income inequality, over the generations (Knight et al. 2013). 
Inequality of wealth 
The empirical evidence around asset inequality is mixed. Ward (2013) constructs and 
compares three distinct measures of household asset wealth that complement traditional 
income- or expenditure-based measures of socioeconomic status. Ward finds that asset wealth 
inequality has actually been declining throughout China since at least 2000, in both urban and 
rural areas. In contrast, Sicular (2013, p. 3) argues that private property is a new source of 
inequality in China: 
“During the Maoist era, private property was prohibited. In the 1980s, tentative steps 
were taken to allow private ownership of some forms of property such as livestock, 
vehicles, and equipment used for family businesses. In the 1990s, new policies opened 
the way for private ownership of a wider range of assets and on a larger scale. This 
included the private ownership of urban housing, which began in the 1990s and was 
basically completed by 2005. Other complementary policy measures promoted the 
development of urban real estate markets for both residential and commercial 
property. It was during this time that the government began to foster the development 
of domestic financial markets and stock markets, and allowed the emergence of 
private businesses.” 
Private property generates income for households through interest earnings, dividends, rents, 
and capital gains. Sicular (2013) reports that, based on calculations using CHIP data, asset 
income contributed to 8–10 percent of national income inequality in 2002, and 13–19 percent 
in 2007.  
Annex Table A6 presents more detail on the composition and growth of urban household 
income per capita from 1995 to 2007. Krever and Zhang (2011) report that, of all sources, 
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 property income has been the main factor causing the most unequal income distribution.  
Regional inequality 
The regional dimensions of inequality are significant in a country as large as China. China 
displays enormous spatial disparities in economic activities, natural resource endowments, 
local market institutions, local government policies and other determinants of income levels 
and economic growth (Zhang and Zou, 2012; Wei, 2007). In 2010, Shanghai’s average urban 
disposable income of 31,383 Yuan was more than twice as high as that of Guizhou (14,142 
Yuan). Similar gaps occur in social indicators, such as mortality and literacy rates. For 
instance, in 2010, China’s most developed regions, such as Shanghai and Beijing, would rank 
within the top 40 nations in the world in terms of the Human Development Index (HDI, a 
composite measure of development involving health, education and income). By contrast, the 
least developed regions, such as Guizhou and Tibet, would rank at about 130 in the world 
(UNDP, 2013a; UNDP, 2013b).  
According to Hao and Wei (2010), income inequality between inland and coastal regions 
grew rapidly throughout the 1980s. They find that inland-coastal inequality accounted for 
more than 60 percent of income inequality across Chinese provinces in 2000, making it the 
largest contributor to China’s intra-provincial inequality. 
 
Studies suggest that the rise in regional inequality can be attributed to trade liberalization and 
fiscal decentralization (Kanbur and Zhang, 2005; Fan et al. 2011). Trade liberalization in 
China was initiated in the 1980s via the Coastal Development Strategy and was reinforced 
after Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour in 1992. This strategy was guided by Deng’s famous 
quote – “let some people get rich first” – which in turn conveyed the implicit understanding 
that others will get rich later. Opening to trade enabled the coastal provinces to exploit their 
geographic advantages as well as preferential treatment from the central government (e.g. 
creation of export processing zones). Coastal provinces thereby attracted disproportionately 
high shares of foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade as shown in Figure 4. In particular, 
Guangdong province alone accounted for 35.1 percent of China’s total trade and 37.5 percent 
of total FDI in 1979-1990, while the share of all inland provinces was only 14.1 percent and 
18.0 percent respectively. In 1991-2004, 91.2 percent of trade and 84.7 percent of FDI were 
accommodated in coastal provinces (Wei and Hao, 2010; Fujita and Hu, 2001). 
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Figure 4: Regional inequality in GDP, FDI and exports in China (2006) 
 
           Source: Sutherland and Yao (2011) 
 
Fiscal decentralization may have also increased regional inequality because, with reforms, 
provinces were forced to be more reliant on their own revenue sources. Coastal provinces 
tend to have a broader non-agricultural tax base, whereas governments in inland provinces 
have to tax their few industrial enterprises heavily to generate revenues. This leads inland 
regions to a vicious cycle of insufficient revenue and a heavier fiscal burden (Zhang, 2006; 
Hao and Wei, 2010). 
While many studies have found a considerable increase in China’s regional income inequality 
since the beginning of the country’s economic reforms, Li and Gibson (2013) point out that 
studies of regional income inequality have commonly ignored the fact that China’s provincial 
GDP per capita data has been based on household registration (hukou) rather than residence. 
If this issue is not properly taken into account, calculating provincial GDP per capita will be 
understated in migrant-sender provinces and overstated in migrant-receiver provinces, and 
this in turn will artificially inflate inter-province income inequality. With, as noted earlier, 
nearly 200 million rural migrants in urban areas without urban hukou, the accuracy of inter-
provincial income inequality computed from provincial GDP per capita is significantly 
reduced.  
After carefully addressing this issue, Li and Gibson (2013) conclude that Chinese economic 
reform does not appear to have been associated with rising regional income inequality after 
all. Li and Gibson (2012) conclude that regional inequality in terms of GDP declined almost 
continuously during 1978 and 1990. About one-third of this decline was reversed over the 
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 next three years in the early 1990s. Regional inequality fluctuated thereafter and by 2010, the 
measure was back at the low levels previously seen in 1990 (Li and Gibson 2013).  
Thus the extent of any rise in regional inequality, and indeed whether there has been a 
significant increase at all, remains an open issue. 
Corruption and grey income  
Corruption is clearly a problem in China. The World Bank's Worldwide Governance 
Indicators ranked China 148th on “control of corruption” and 220th on “voice and 
accountability” out of 235 countries in 2009 (Knight, 2013). The prevalence of corruption 
likely influences both underlying inequality and measured inequality, since “grey income” 
(for example, the collection by some officials of huge amounts of money at the weddings of 
their children and relatives) is likely to be both unequally distributed and underreported. 
Based on the urban household income and expenditure data collected by their own surveys, 
Wang and Woo (2011) use an ingenious method (the relationship between the share of 
expenditure sent on food and income level) to estimate the “grey income” of the Chinese 
households. Wang and Woo find that the ratio of the estimated income to official income 
increased from 1.12 for the lowest income group to 3.19 for the highest income group. Total 
household disposable income in 2008 is 14.0 trillion Yuan according to the official data but 
23.2 trillion Yuan according to their estimates. 63 percent of the unreported income belonged 
to the wealthiest 10 percent of urban households. Using this measure, the income of the 
wealthiest 10 percent of Chinese households is 65 times that of the poorest 10 percent, 
instead of the 23 times reported in the official data (Wang and Woo 2011). 
Functional distribution of income: Evidence from China and the United States 
The fundamental cause for the rising income inequality globally according to Piketty is that 
the return to capital has been persistently higher than the growth rate of the economy leading 
to an increasing share of capital and decreasing share of wages in national income. The 
functional distribution of income can also be found in China over the transition period. Figure 
5 shows the factor payment shares for capital, high-skilled, medium-skilled and low-skilled 
labor in total national income in China. The data are drawn from the World Input-Output 
Database (WIOD), which contains the socio-economic accounts for 40 major countries taking 
up around 80 percent of the global output value. In these accounts, data on hours worked by 
and compensation for three types of labour (high-skill, medium-skill and low-skill) and 
compensation for capital inputs and capital stock are reported. Since capital compensation is 
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 derived from gross value added minus labour compensation, capital compensation is thus the 
remuneration for all kinds of capital (such as R&D, software, database development, 
branding and organizational capital), mineral resources, land and financial capital (Timmer, 
ed., 2012).  
Figure 5: Factor payment shares in China, 1995-2009 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the data from the World Input-Output Database 
(WIOD). 
Figure 5 shows that capital share in national income in China has clearly demonstrated the 
trend of increasing over the period under study while the share for low-skilled labor are 
falling over the same period. This finding is consistent with the findings found by Piketty 
(2014) for many other countries showing the functional distribution of income in favor of 
capital owners at the expenses of low-skilled (and to some extent medium-skilled labor) is 
indeed an important source of the rising income inequality in China. This raises an important 
question as to whether China should consider adopting a progressive annual tax on capital as 
proposed by Piketty as an effective way of bringing its high income inequality down.  
The figure also shows that the share for high-skilled labor even though relatively small in the 
total income is increasing over time.  One implication is that human capital formation in 
terms of producing more high-skilled workers could be the only factor which increases its 
factor payment shares in total income balancing the rising of capital shares in total income. 
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 But at the same time, the rising share of high-skilled labor may itself be a source of rising 
income inequality as compared with the falling shares for both medium and low-skilled labor. 
This is indeed the case for the United States (Figure 6) which shows that the factor shares for 
high-skill labor are steadily increasing along with the increase in capital shares while the 
income shares for medium-skilled continued to fall with low-skilled labor accounting for a 
very low share of income.  
This may suggest that increasing human skills through education or training could be 
unambiguous in influencing income inequality. For example, the expansion of the shares of 
high-skilled labor in the United States didn’t do much in reducing income inequality. On the 
contrary, it may help with raising the degree of income inequality there which has been 
getting worse (Stiglitz 2012). For China, there may be a huge potential as compared with the 
United States to further increase its human capital formation which will be crucial for the task 
of economic rebalancing towards an innovative country. At the same time, there is need to 
explore further the link between human capital formation and income inequality. 
Figure 6: Factor payment shares in the United States, 1995-2009 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the data from the World Input-Output Database 
(WIOD). 
To further compare Figures 5 and 6, we can also see that the expansion of capital income 
share in total income is more rapid in China than in the United States over the same period 
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 possibly due to the transitional nature of the Chinese economy as mentioned earlier in the 
paper.  This observation also means that if the trend continues the functional distribution of 
income as a source of income inequality in China will become more entrenched and difficult 
to tackle.  This the context by which we discuss the policy responses to the rising income 
inequality below. 
POLICY RESPONSES TO INCOME INEQUALITY 
In the early stages of the economic reform process, inequality was not viewed as a problem, 
but rather, under the “let some people get rich first” policy, a necessary ingredient for success. 
However, with incomes rising continuously (and indeed spectacularly) over time, the Chinese 
leadership has come to be less sanguine about rising inequality. More generally, the 
leadership has started to stress the goal of “harmony” or having a “harmonious” society. 
Rising inequality is seen as a threat to the achievement of this goal, and a precursor to social 
instability. 
In 2013, the Chinese government released its Income Distribution Plan, also known as the 
“35 Point Plan”. The plan acknowledges that “the urban-rural gap and the difference in 
citizen’s income is relatively large, income is irregularly distributed, there are obvious 
problems of grey income and illegal income, and some of the masses live in difficult 
conditions” (Salidjanova, 2013). Its key measures include “boosting minimum wages to at 
least 40 percent of average salaries, loosening controls on lending and deposit rates, and 
increasing spending on education and affordable housing, … a requirement that state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) should contribute more of their profits to the effort of reducing inequality, 
and a commitment to push through market oriented interest rate reforms to give savers a 
better return and more security” (Salidjanova, 2013).  
This section presents a number of policy measures undertaken by the Chinese government, 
through the 35-point plan and other initiatives, to address income inequality.  
Regional development policies  
As discussed earlier, during the 1980s and 1990s, the Chinese government adopted 
preferential policies for the coastal regions, for example by establishing export processing 
zones along the coastal regions. This potentially increased income inequality between regions. 
Since the late 1990s, Chinese leaders have been increasingly concerned that the poorer 
western region is being left behind. The Great Western Development (GWD) strategy 
adopted in 1999 targeted 12 provinces and autonomous regions in the central and western 
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 parts of China. The GWD, which is still in force, provides some preferential policies to the 
western region through special taxation rates, land use rights, foreign investment and 
favourable bank loans, huge fiscal transfers, transportation and other infrastructure 
investment, ecological protection (such as reforestation), and the provision of public services 
in areas such as education, health and social welfare. To address the development gap 
between the central and eastern regions, in 2003, the Chinese government began to 
implement the North-East Revival Strategy. In recent years, it has enacted the Rise of Central 
China program. Through all these development programs, large volumes of state funds have 
been invested in infrastructure, energy, environment and resources projects in the western and 
central regions to help them catch up with the eastern region. 
Minimum wage policy and urban income inequality 
Minimum wage regulations were first introduced in urban China in the late 1990s, but only 
started to be used actively to combat income inequality several years later. Today, the 
minimum wage is regarded as an important public policy tool to reduce poverty and income 
inequality. In 2004, the government introduced a new minimum wage law, which ensured the 
application of minimum wages to state-owned and private enterprises, and to employees in 
self-employed businesses. The new law also required local governments to renew the 
minimum wage standards at least once every two years, increased penalties for violations, 
and placed tighter restrictions on what could be included when calculating wages (e.g. ruling 
out the inclusion of overtime and canteen and traveling supplements). The new law led to 
frequent and substantial increases in minimum wages in subsequent years (Fang and Lin 
2013).  
Lin and Yun (2014) use a large set of panel data at the county level that contains relevant 
information on minimum wages, combined with a longitudinal household survey of 16 
representative provinces, to estimate the distributional effect of minimum wage changes in 
China over the 2002 to 2009 period. They find that minimum wage changes significantly 
helped reduce the total income gap at the bottom end of the income distribution. They further 
decomposed the total change in China’s income distribution and found that minimum wage 
changes contributed substantially to reducing the income gap at the bottom end of the 
distribution, especially in the post-2004 period. Likewise, the results for Gini coefficients and 
the variance also suggest that improvements to the minimum wage helped reduce income 
inequality in all periods of their analysis. Some other studies on the impact of minimum 
wages on inequality are less optimistic. First, there is the problem that minimum wage 
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 regulations may cause job losses for low-wage workers. Fang and Lin (2013) use the same 
panel data as used in Lin and Yuan (2014) but focus on the period 2004-2009. They find that 
minimum wage changes have significant negative effects on employment in the eastern and 
central regions of China, and resulted in job loss for urban workers at the bottom end of the 
wage distribution, especially for females, young adults and low-skilled workers. Second, 
there is incomplete coverage and enforcement of minimum wage regulations, especially in 
the informal sector, which employs a large share of low-income workers (Ngok, 2008). 
Reforms to increase rural incomes  
To raise rural incomes and alleviate rural-urban income inequality, the central government 
announced the decision to abolish the agricultural tax and prohibit the collection of fees by 
local governments in 2006. Annex Table A7 shows the changes in the burden of taxes 
(including fees) from 1988 to 2007. The average tax rate was 5 percent in 1988 and 5.3 
percent in 1995. A pilot reform of agricultural taxation was launched in 2000. In 2002, the 
average tax rate dropped to 2.8 per cent. When the agricultural tax was abolished nationwide 
in 2007, the average tax burden on farmers dropped to 0.3 percent. Luo and Sicular (2011) 
find that abolition of agricultural taxes and fees has had a positive impact on poverty, but that 
the impact on rural inequality has been small since agricultural tax has never played a 
significant role in determining rural inequality. The policy may have had a positive impact on 
national inequality through reducing the urban-rural income gap.  
The central government’s program to Build a New Socialist Countryside, a new policy 
approach to rural development, was officially promulgated in March 2006. This initiative 
requires local governments to promote comprehensive rural development, including 
infrastructural and agricultural modernization linked to ecological sustainability, and the 
provision of public goods such as social welfare and basic education. It aims to achieve a 
comprehensive transformation of the Chinese countryside through the consolidation of rural 
population centres and the spread of commercialized agriculture (Ahler and Schubert, 2009). 
Drawing on fieldwork conducted in two Chinese counties in 2008 and 2009, Ahlers and 
Schubert (2009) provide a positive evaluation of the implementation of this policy. These 
policy changes with associated reform measures contributed to the relatively high growth of 
rural incomes in recent years.  
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 Social welfare policies 
A policy to alleviate both urban and rural income inequality is the minimum living standard 
program (dibao) (Annex Table A8). This was piloted in Shanghai in 1993. By 2003, the 
number of urban beneficiaries had reached 22.5 million; since then, the number of 
participants has fluctuated roughly around this level. According to the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs, the main dibao beneficiaries in urban areas are the unemployed, the elderly without 
pensions, and children. In 2009, these three groups accounted for more than 70 percent of all 
recipients. In recent years, dibao thresholds and benefits have been raised. China’s rural 
dibao program was established later than the urban program and did not extend to all rural 
areas until 2007. During 2006-2010, the country started providing the social pension system 
to rural aged people over 60. By 2011, 85.3 million were in receipt of the pension (Li, 2013). 
The implementation of dibao is a first step in the creation of a social safety net in China. 
Reform of the taxation system 
A progressive income taxation requires high-income people to pay a higher rate of tax than 
low-income people. China also needs to consider adopting and improving various kinds of 
capital tax in responding to the rising share of capital in total national income. This policy 
instrument becomes more pertinent given the evidence that the functional distribution of 
income has increasingly become a source of income inequality as identified in this paper. 
With the introduction of market reforms, the government realized it would no longer be able 
to rely on state-sector wages to provide implicit taxation. China introduced an individual 
income taxation system in 1980. At the beginning, the threshold was set so high that virtually 
no one had to pay income taxes. China’s income tax law has changed very little since its 
creation, but exemption thresholds have been reduced to make more of the population subject 
to income tax (Piketty and Qian, 2009). Piketty and Qian (2009) find that the fraction of the 
population in China subject to income tax has increased from less than 0.1 percent in 1986 to 
about 15-20 percent in 2008. They show that income tax revenues in China have increased 
rapidly from less than 0.1 percent of GDP in 1986 to over 1.5 percent in 2005, and 2.5 
percent in 2008.  
To what extent does personal income taxation affect income inequality? According to Knight 
(2013), despite reforms direct taxation is still low and has little effect on urban income 
inequality in China. In 2008, personal income tax represented less than 0.01 percent of the 
household income of those in the lowest income decile, 0.12 percent in the sixth decile, and 
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 2.1 percent in the highest decile. Knight (2013) suggests that other types of taxes could be 
adopted to deal with income inequality. For instance, property taxes could be used to adjust 
for inequality in income from assets.  
Policies to improve the equality of education 
China has made significant progress in the expansion of education. Average years of 
schooling increased from 6.79 years in 1996 to 8.28 years in 2008. Today, nine years of 
education is compulsory and virtually universal. A series of government policies have been 
adopted to promote equalization of education (Yang et al. 2014). For example, in order to 
help poor families overcome the financial barriers to access to compulsory education in rural 
areas, all fees for compulsory education in rural areas in western China were abolished in 
2006. This policy was extended to central and eastern China in 2007. Despite these efforts, 
education inequality in terms of rural-urban divides, gender gaps, regional differentials, and 
social stratification has continued to be a serious social concern. Despite rapid education 
expansion, high-quality educational opportunities are still scarce in China. When income 
inequality is high, it could be difficult for poorer families to receive an adequate share of the 
available high-quality education resources. This can further aggravate income inequality, 
forming a vicious cycle (Knight et al. 2009). To address the issue, the Chinese government 
could increase public education expenditure to help achieve more equal distribution of 
education resources. Yet spending on education has been falling as a share of government 
expenditure (Figure 7).  
Figure 7: China’s educational spending: percentage of government expenditure and GDP 
 
Source: Yang et al. (2014) 
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 Required institutional reform 
Institutional reforms hold the key for addressing the balance between efficiency and equity as 
they provide the mechanisms by which the relative pay-offs for both government sector and 
the private sector are determined. Without these changes in institutions linking to incentives, 
the risks are high that public policies aimed at achieving more equitable distribution of 
income will compromise efficiency which is not conductive for the long-term development. 
The onging anti-corruption campaign in China will no doubt help reducing wealth and 
income at top end which is conducive to improved income distribution, but it is also 
important to design and improve the system of incentives for both the government sector and 
private sector to boost the efficiency.  
Institutional reforms need to be more comprehensive. As argued by Martinez-Bravo et al, 
(2012), reforms in governance of both of the government and corporations, and the 
strengthening the rule of law and grassroots democracy will help with reducing income 
inequality. China is committed to further economic reform especially market-oriented 
reforms which will lower the entry barriers for private capital to engage with many key 
sectors of the economy such as the finance, telecommunications, railways and energy sectors 
which tend to pay much higher salaries than those firms in more competitive sectors. Various 
kinds of administrative powers will be reduced to enable markets to play a more significant 
role. As a result, fair competition can be upheld allowing all parties to compete in market 
places on an equal footing leading to a fairer wage structure in the economy.  However, those 
who have vested interests and benefit from monopoly control may resist these policy shifts. 
The deepening of market-oriented reforms has become the subject of heated debate as various 
groups attempt to influence policy directions (Duan and Saich 2014). 
Conclusions 
It has become increasingly challenging for the Chinese government to tackle the issue of 
rising income inequality out of the economic, social and political considerations. Identifying 
those sources and causes of inequality is the first step for accomplishing the task which has 
been researched by many. For this purpose, the paper reviews some of the key findings in the 
literature with respect to the main sources of income inequality and discusses some policy 
implications for narrowing down income inequality in China. These policies include those on 
regional development, rural development, the social welfare system for low income people, 
20 
 
 taxation and education among others highlighting the roles of both institutional changes and 
policy adjustment.  
A new contribution in this study is to provide some empirical evidence showing that the 
functional distribution of income has indeed become an important source for causing the 
rising income inequality in China. The rapid economic growth in China has been relying on a 
model that pays high returns to various kinds of capital including financial capital and real 
estate, while the ownership of capital is very unequal. This finding prompts us to rethink 
about the causes of China’s income inequality and to formulate appropriate policies such as 
taxation on capital returns based on the new way of understanding this pressing issue of 
income distribution in China.  
At the same time, policy designs have to take into account the consideration of the possible 
trade-off between efficiency and equity. The challenge is to maintain efficiency gains while 
reducing income inequality. This requires the combination of implementing appropriate 
public policies for addressing equity concerns with adopting further measures for deepening 
institutional reforms for achieving efficiency gains through improved incentives.  
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 ANNEX: 
Table A1: Inter-household inequality for China: Gini estimates (1978-2013) 
Year WDI 
Ravallion and Chen 
(2007) 
WIID CHIP 
Lin et al. (2010) 
NBS 
Data not 
adjusted 
by spatial 
price 
index 
Data 
adjusted 
by spatial 
price 
index 
Data not 
adjusted 
by spatial 
price 
index 
Data 
adjusted 
by spatial 
price 
index 
1978 … … … 0.317 … … … … 
1979 … … … … … … … … 
1980 … … … … … … … … 
1981 0.291 0.310 0.280 … … … … … 
1982 … 0.285 0.259 … … … … … 
1983 … 0.283 0.260 0.284 … … … … 
1984 0.277 0.291 0.269 … … … … … 
1985 … 0.290 0.265 0.224 … … … … 
1986 … 0.324 0.292 … … … … … 
1987 0.299 0.324 0.289 … … … … … 
1988 … 0.330 0.295 0.382 0.395 … … … 
1989 … 0.352 0.318 … … … … … 
1990 0.324 0.349 0.316 … … 0.345 0.287 … 
1991 … 0.371 0.331 0.341 … … … … 
1992 … 0.390 0.342 … … … … … 
1993 0.355 0.420 0.367 … … … … … 
1994 … 0.433 0.376 … … … … … 
1995 … 0.415 0.365 0.290 0.469 0.397 0.329 … 
1996 0.357 0.398 0.351 0.390 … … … … 
1997 … 0.398 0.350 … … … … … 
1998 … 0.403 0.354 … … … … … 
1999 0.392 0.416 0.364 … … … … … 
2000 … 0.438 0.385 0.390 … 0.411 0.347 … 
2001 … 0.447 0.395 … … … … … 
2002 0.426 … … 0.454 0.468 … … … 
2003 … … … 0.449 … … … 0.479 
2004 … … … … … … … 0.473 
2005 0.425 … … … … 0.457 0.388 0.485 
2006 … … … … … … … 0.487 
2007 … … … … 0.497 … … 0.484 
2008 0.426 … … … … … … 0.491 
2009 0.421 … … … … … … 0.490 
2010 … … … … … … … 0.481 
2011 … … … … … … … 0.477 
2012 … … … … … … … 0.474 
2013 … … … … … … … 0.473 
 
  Source: Wang et al. (2014) 
  Note: …=data not available, WIID=World Income Inequality Database of UNU-WIDER
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 Table A2: Income inequality in Asia (2000-2011) 
Country Gini coefficient 
Vietnam 0.376 
India 0.368 
Sri Lanka 0.403 
Philippines 0.44 
Bangladesh 0.31 
Pakistan 0.327 
China 0.474 
 Source: Riskin (2014).  
 
 
Table A3: The Gini coefficient of income inequality for selected large developing 
countries (circa 1988 and circa 2007) 
Country Circa 1988 Circa 2007 Change 
China (World Bank) 0.30 0.43 0.13 
China (CHIP Survey) 0.38 0.49 0.11 
Bangladesh 0.29 0.32 0.03 
Brazil 0.61 0.56 -0.05 
Egypt 0.32 0.31 -0.01 
India 0.32 0.33 0.01 
Indonesia 0.29 0.34 0.05 
Iran 0.44 0.38 -0.06 
Nigeria 0.39 0.49 0.10 
Pakistan 0.33 0.30 -0.03 
Philippines 0.41 0.43 0.02 
Russian Federation 0.24 0.43 0.19 
South Africa 0.59 0.63 0.04 
Thailand 0.44 0.41 -0.03 
Turkey 0.44 0.39 -0.05 
Vietnam 0.36 0.36 0.00 
Source: Knight (2013). 
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Table A4: Ownership of major durable consumer goods in China 
Per 100 households at 
year-end 
Rural household Urban households 
Item 1990 2000 2012 1990 2000 2012 
Washing machine 9.12 28.58 67.22 78.41 90.50 98.02 
Refrigerator 1.22 12.31 67.32 42.33 80.10 98.48 
Air conditioner 
 
1.32 25.36 0.34 30.80 126.81 
Motorcycle 0.89 21.94 62.20 1.94 18.8 20.27 
Telephone 
 
26.38 42.24 
  
68.41 
Mobile telephone 
 
4.32 197.80 
 
19.5 212.64 
Color TV 4.72 48.74 116.90 59.04 116.6 136.07 
Camera 0.70 3.12 5.18 19.22 38.4 46.42 
Computer 
 
0.47 21.36 
 
9.7 87.03 
Source: China’s National Bureau of Statistics (2013). 
 
 
Table A5: Wage disparities between urban workers and migrant workers 
 
Year 
Migrants (NBS) Migrants (MOA) Local workers Wage difference 
Nominal Real Nominal Real Nominal Real 
Ratio of local 
worker to 
migrant wage 
(MOA) 
2001 644 644 . . 903 896.7 1.39 
2002 659 665.7 . . 1031 1041.4 1.56 
2003 702 702.8 781 774 1164 1153.6 1.64 
2004 780 755.9 802 776.4 1327 1284.6 1.7 
2005 861 821.3 855 841.5 1517 1493.1 1.82 
2006 946 889 953 938.9 1738 1712.3 1.93 
2007 1015a 912.8 1060 1014.4 2078 1988.5 2.18 
 
Source: Xue (2013) 
Note: 1. “a” is the average monthly earnings for the first three quarters in 2007.  
2. MOA refers to Ministry of Agriculture, China. 
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 Table A6: Composition and growth of urban household income per capita (1995, 2002 and 
2007) 
Income source Share of income (%) 
Average annual growth 
(constant prices) (%) 
 1995 2002 2007 1995-2002 2002-2007 
Employment 
earnings 
66.8 69.0 65.8 6.0 10.2 
Pension income 12.7 17.3 19.2 10.1 13.6 
Business 
income 
3.5 6.0 10.6 13.3. 24.7 
Imputed rents 
on owner-
occupied 
housing 
0.6 3.3 7.1 34.6 29.9 
Other asset 
income 
1.4 1.1 1.5 -5.5 18.0 
Net transfers 
and other 
15.1 3.3 -4.1 -8.4 -32.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.1 5.7 11.3 
Source: Table 2 in Li and Sicular (2014) 
 
 
 
Table A7: Average tax rate (including fees) paid by households in different income per 
capita groups in rural China  
 1988 1995 2002 2007 
Average 5.0 5.3 2.8 0.3 
Lowest 10%  7.5 13.9 6.2 0.3 
Lowest 20% 6.5 12.0 5.4 0.3 
Highest 20% 4.1 3.4 1.7 0.3 
Highest 10% 3.8 3.0 1.5 0.3 
 
Source: Li and Sicular (2014) 
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Table A8 Minimum Living Standard Guarantee Program (Dibao) (2001-2013) 
 
 Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Rural 
People 
(million) 
3.0 4.1 3.7 4.9 8.3 15.9 35.7 43.1 47.6 52.1 53.1 53.4 53.9 
Funds (billion 
Yuan) 
      10.91 22.87 36.30 44.50 66.77 71.8 86.69 
Standard 
(Yuan/month) 
      70.0 82.3 100.8 117.0 143.2 172.3 202.8 
Urban 
People 
(1,000) 
11.7 20.6 22.5 22.1 22.3 22.4 22.7 23.3 23.5 23.1 22.8 21.4 21.0 
Funds (billion 
Yuan) 
     22.42 27.74 39.34 48.21 52.47 65.99 67.4 75.67 
Standard 
(Yuan/month) 
  149.0 152.0 156.0 169.6 182.4 205.3 227.8 251.2 287.6 330.1 373.0 
            
           Source: Li (2013), Ministry of Civil Affairs China, and Li and Sicular (2014) 
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